Harold Hodes in [ ] introduces an extension of rst-order modal logic featuring a backtracking operator, and provides a possible worlds semantics, according to which the operator is a kind of device for 'world travel'; he does not provide a proof theory. In this paper, I provide a natural deduction system for modal logic featuring this operator, and argue that the system can be motivated in terms of a reading of the backtracking operator whereby it serves to indicate modal scope. I prove soundness and completeness theorems with respect to Hodes' semantics, as well as semantics with fewer restrictions on the accessibility relation (Hodes restricts his attention to S ).
. Introduction
Harold Hodes in [ ] introduces an extension of rst-order modal logic featuring a backtracking operator '↓'. e purpose of this operator is similar to that of an actuality operator. But, instead of exempting what follows from the scope of all enclosing modal operators, it exempts it only from the innermost modal operator. Or, in terms of the possible worlds semantics, instead of causing a formula to be evaluated at some speci ed 'actual' world, the backtracking operator causes a formula to be evaluated at the 'last visited' world, so to speak.
Hodes gives a semantics (which I give an overview of in section ), but does not supply a proof theory.
is semantics re ects a reading of the operator as one which allows more exible 'travel' through worlds in evaluating the truth of a formula. If the semantics of ◻ and are thought of as instructions to travel to an accessible world in which the truth of a formula is evaluated, Hodes' semantics for ↓ gives instructions to travel back to the world most recently passed through, to evaluate the truth of a formula there. A useful comparison is to the actuality operator. e usual semantics for an actuality operator gives directions to evaluate the truth of a formula at a privileged possible world in the model-the actual world. But, as mentioned, there is another-more syntactic-reading of the operator, as a scope indicator. at is, the operator simply indicates that what follows it is to be exempt from the scope of the innermost modal operator. Again, compare with the actuality operator; this may be taken to be an indicator that what follows is to be evaluated as exempt from the scope of all enclosing modal operators. us, the role of ↓ is akin to that of parentheses, yet allowing for more nuanced scope distinctions. e aim of this paper is to provide a proof system for modal logics featuring the operator, which I will claim does justice to this reading; the proof theory gives rules for 'looking inside' the scope of a modal operator, and then, when the ↓ operator is encountered, pulling the appended formula out of that scope.
As well as explaining this alternative reading of the operator, such a proof theory may be desirable from the point of view of certain philosophical or other uses of modal logic. For example, extensions of modal logic may be desired to gain expressive power without committing oneself to quantifying over possible worlds (or their analogues) or to the members of domains of possible worlds. In some cases, modal logic may be introduced speci cally for the purposes of avoiding quanti cation over some entities or other. A proof theory would allow somebody not to rely on the semantics to give sense to claims involving ↓.
Nonetheless, even if one is not persuaded of the need for a proof theory for such purposes, the fact that the operator appears to admit of the syntactic reading should be motivation enough to develop a proof theory which represents such a reading.
Before presenting the proof system, in section I will give an overview of the semantics which Hodes provides for the operator, albeit with a few minor di erences. In section I present a natural deduction system for the operator for propositional modal logic featuring the operator, which makes uses of labelling each line of a proof. In section , I motivate the natural deduction system in terms of the scope exemption reading of the operator. In section I prove that the deduction system is sound and complete with respect to models whose accessibility relation is serial. Finally, in section I discuss strengthening the logic and prove corresponding soundness and completeness theorems for restricted classes of models.
. Semantics
Let L ↓ be a typical language for propositional modal logic; it consists of countably many propositional variables p, q, r, . . ., connectives ∧ and ¬ and a necessity operator ◻. In addition, it shall have an additional sentential operator ↓, called the backtracking operator. e intended e ect of the backtracking operator will be to exempt what follows it from the scope of the innermost modal operator from which it is not already exempt (so, for example, p, ◻↓p and ◻◻↓↓p should all be counted as equivalent). Other sentential connectives ∨, → and a possibility operator can be de ned in the usual way.
e semantics presented here is essentially that of [ ], with the main di erences being: (a) Hodes' semantics is for quanti ed modal logic, whereas I will only describe the case for propositional modal logic (I discuss extending to quanti ed modal logic brie y in section ). (b) Hodes' logic is an extension of S , so that the accessibility relation is an equivalence, whereas the only restriction on the equivalence relation here is that it is serial. (c) Hodes only de nes satisfaction for a certain class of formulas, whereas the semantics presented here places no such restriction.
A model is a triple M = ⟨W , R, a⟩, where W is a set (of possible worlds), R ⊆ W × W is the accessibility relation, and a is an assignment function which assigns to each propositional variable p at a world w ∈ W a truth value a(w, p) ∈ {T, F}.
Only one restraint will be placed on the accessibility relation for now, and that is that it is serial. So, for any w ∈ W there is a w ′ ∈ W such that wRw ′ .
en, a satisfaction relation is de ned, not for each world, but for eachnite sequence of worlds of the appropriate type. So, we rst make the following de nition:
De nition . Given a model M, a world sequence is a member of the following set:
As a result of seriality, for every world sequence there will be a world sequence extending it (and so there are world sequences of arbitrary length).
Some terminology for members of WS M will be useful. I shall write ⃗ w for an arbitrary member of WS M . Where ⃗ w = ⟨w , . . . , w k ⟩, then:
. . , w l ⟩ for l < k, then I shall write that w extends (or is an extension of ) w ′ , and that w ′ truncates (or is a truncation of ) w. Now, we can de ne satisfaction of a formula at a world sequence as follows:
De nition . Let ϕ be a formula of L ↓ , M a model, and ⃗ w ∈ WS M . en, M, ⃗ w ⊧ ϕ is de ned inductively as follows:
Where ϕ is a propositional variable p:
For modal operators (including ↓):
Note that, although this de nition is only given for when ⃗ w ∈ WS M , there is nothing which requires this, rather than that ⃗ w is any sequence of worlds. But, given the clause for ◻, it will only ever be ⃗ w ∈ WS which are relevant. Later on, however (section ), it will be necessary to consider such an extension. Where M is clear from context, I will sometime write ⃗ w ⊧ ϕ in place of M, ⃗ w ⊧ ϕ.
A consequence relation can then be de ned:
De nition . Where Γ is a set of formulas in L ↓ , and ϕ a formula of L ↓ , then Γ ⊧ ϕ i :
For all M and w ∈ W M , if M, ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ψ for each ψ ∈ Γ, then M, ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ϕ.
. Proof theory
In this section I shall describe a natural deduction system for the logic. is will consist of an introduction and elimination rule for each connective and operator, and a de nition of the notion of a deduction. An important feature will be that deductions and inference rules will operate on labelled formulas. A labelled formula is a pair ϕ; ⃗ s, where ϕ is a formula of L ↓ , and ⃗ s is a (possibly empty) nite sequence of natural numbers. Where the label is empty, I shall write ϕ ; −. e same terminology as for world sequences will be used, with the exception that for labels, where ⃗ s = ⟨n , . . . , n k ⟩ I shall write:
e rules are as follows:
(With a restriction on the (◻-I) rule that ϕ ; ⃗ s may only depend on assumptions with labels ⃗ t which are truncations of ⃗ s.)
With these rules, rules for the de ned connectives and operators can be deduced. In particular, rules for will be:
(with no restriction on the introduction rule, and a restriction on the elimination rule that ⃗ t is either ⃗ s or a truncation of ⃗ s).
Since deductions in the system will involve discharging assumptions and restrictions on which assumptions are allowed, the notion of a deduction rule corresponding to each inference rule-which will specify how assumptions are to be discharged-is needed (c.f. [ ]). Deduction rules are n-tuples of the form ⟨⟨Γ , θ ; ⃗ s ⟩, . . . , ⟨Γ k , θ k ; ⃗ s k ⟩⟩, which say that when θ ; ⃗ s , . . . θ k− ; ⃗ s k− have been derived using undischarged assumptions Γ . . . Γ k− respectively, then ϕ k ; ⃗ s k can be derived with undischarged assumptions Γ k . For example, the deduction rule corresponding to (¬-I) will be ⟨⟨Γ, p∧¬p ; ⃗ t⟩, ⟨Γ {ϕ}, ¬ϕ ; ⃗ s⟩⟩. e deduction rules can simply be read o the rules as presented here.
Two notions of proof-theoretic consequence can then be de ned-one for labelled formulas, and one for unlabelled formulas. Since we are interested in deductions between formulas of L ↓ , and since such formulas are unlabelled, then strictly speaking, the relation between labelled formulas is not one of provability. It is rather simply a stepping stone towards the provability relation between (unlabelled) formulas. is latter relation is what we are primarily interested in.
De nition . Let ∆ be a set of labelled formulas of L ↓ , and ϕ ; ⃗ s a labelled formula of L ↓ . en ∆ ⊢ ϕ ; ⃗ s i there is some sequence of ordered pairs:
• ∆ n = ∆ and θ n ; ⃗ t n is ϕ ; ⃗ s
• For i ≤ n, either:
⟩⟩ is an instance of one of the deduction rules corresponding to the inference rules.
De nition . Where Γ is a set of (unlabelled) formulas of L ↓ , and ϕ a formula of L ↓ , then Γ ⊢ ϕ i Γ * ⊢ ϕ ; −, where Γ * is the set of labelled formulas resulting from replacing each ψ ∈ Γ by ψ ; − (i.e. ψ together with an empty label).
. Motivation
Before proving that the inference rules given here are both sound and complete with respect to the semantics, I would rst like to say more about the motivation behind the proof theory. ere are two aims which I have. e rst concerns a worry which may be had if the proof theory is wanted in order to avoid reliance on the possible worlds semantics for more than pragmatic reasons. It might be worried that, due to the presence of labels-which it is tempting to take as referring to worlds or sequences of worlds-the proof theory does not succeed in avoiding reliance on the possible worlds semantics. Secondly, I claimed before that the natural deduction system can be seen as explaining the reading of the ↓ operator as exempting formulas from the scope of other operators. Here I will argue for that claim.
One way in which we may try to motivate the proof system is by reference to the semantics. On this view, a labelled formula is a formula of a kind of extended language, and the labels are something like variables referring to sequences of worlds. en, a formula (of the extended language) ϕ; ⃗ s makes the claim that ϕ is true at the sequence of worlds ⃗ s. e inference rules then aim to capture certain valid inferences in this language. A soundness theorem will then be an essential part of the motivation of the proof theory, in that it will show that the inference rules are indeed valid inference rules-that is, they are truth preserving in the sense of the semantics. ( is will also require an extension of the semantics given in section so that labelled formulas are given satisfaction conditions.)
But given one motivation for developing a proof theory, this will not do. ere are potential philosophical applications of such a proof theory whose aim is to avoid reference to, and quanti cation over, worlds. at is, they wish to relegate the semantics to a purely secondary, pragmatic role. But if the proof theory is ultimately motivated by the semantics, then this can not be the case. In any case, such a motivation would fail to shed light on the scope exemption reading of the ↓ operator.
So, instead, we wish to have a motivation for the proof theory which derives from this scope exemption reading of the operator. en, a soundness theorem will not play a role in motivating the proof theory in light of the semantics, but will rather play the role-along with a completeness theorem-of motivating the pragmatic value of the semantics. For, given a soundness theorem, one will be able to use the semantics for useful ends, in proving that a certain formula is not derivable from other formulas, and so on.
How might such a motivation look? Firstly, labels must not be thought of as referring to worlds. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that they are not part of the language at all. ey are merely part of the proof theory, and can be explained as a kind of bookkeeping device, not dissimilar to the use of line numbers, the lists of undischarged assumptions which are common in many ways of laying out formal proofs, or even to the various horizontal and vertical lines which appear in many ways of laying out proofs. It is perhaps better to think, not of labelled formulas, but of labelled lines (it just happens that it is simpler for metatheoretical purposes to treat labels as attaching to formulas).
If labels are not part of the language, then there can be no danger that they refer to anything in the semantics (just as line numbers and the like do not). Indeed, labelled formulas are not the kind of thing that can be asserted, or the kind of thing that have truth-conditions or satisfaction-conditions. Since labelled formulas are not the kind of thing that can be true or false, and the inference rules are relations between labelled formulas, it follows that the inference rules can not be motivated in terms of validity (i.e. necessary truth preservation). A di erent motivation is thus required.
e main rules which need motivating are the ◻ and ↓ rules. ese can be motivated, not in terms of validity, but rather as rules for temporarily ignoring, and then reinstating, modal operators, whilst the labels serve as a reminder as to when a modal operator is being ignored.
Consider rst the rules for ◻, and in particular ◻-E. is says that, given a formula ◻ϕ, we may temporarily ignore the outermost ◻, as long as we make a note that a necessity operator is being ignored, and that we must eventually reinstate it.
is note is the label. So, we have the inference:
. ◻ϕ . ϕ; e ◻-I rule then does the reverse. It tells us that, if we have a label signifying that a necessity operator is being ignored (and that this label was not introduced in an assumption), then we may reinstate the necessity operator at the same time as removing the label. For example, the above proof could be continued as follows:
. ◻ϕ
Getting us back to where we started.
e rules for the ↓ operator tell us what we can do when we encounter that operator within the scope of a necessity operator-i.e. when we encounter that operator on a line with a label. In that case, the intended interpretation of the ↓ operator is that it exempts what follows from the scope of the necessity operator.
us, we can remove the label at the same time as removing the ↓ operator. I.e., we are permitted to permanently ignore the necessity operator, since the backtracking operator cancels out the scope.
For example, if, in the above case, ϕ is ↓ψ, then we may continue the proof as follows:
. ↓ψ;
. ψ Finally, the ↓-I rule allows us to do the reverse. at is, we can append ↓ to a formula, as long as we also make a note that we are required to encapsulate the resulting formula in a necessity operator in order to cancel the backtracking operator. Taken together with the ◻-I rule, this allows us to produce the converse of the above proof that ◻↓ψ entails ψ. e rules for connectives, which do not alter the labels in any way, simply tell us that we can manipulate these connectives in the usual way, even if we are temporarily ignoring the scope of a necessity operator.
ere is one nal comment that is required in order to justify the proof theory, and that concerns the speci c form (or perhaps, the speci c structure) that the labels take. Labels must be able to carry information about how many modal operators are being ignored, so as to deal with nested operators. So, for example, comparable to the inference above from ◻↓ψ to ψ, we can give the following inference from ◻◻↓↓ψ to ψ:
e appearance of a label with length on line tells us that, at that point, we are ignoring two nested modal operators.
So, the length of a label measures the number of operators currently being ignored. But, if we just need to measure that, then why do we need to do it with a sequence of natural numbers, rather than a single natural number (in which case it would be the number itself, rather than the length of a sequence, which does the measuring)? e reason is that there may be need, considering the restriction on the ◻-I rule, to introduce two assumptions with di erent labels but of the same length.
For example, consider the derived ( -E) rule:
where ⃗ t is either ⃗ s or a truncation of ⃗ s (this restriction follows from the restriction on the (◻-I) rule). Now, it must be possible to introduce separate labels of the form ⟨⃗ s, n⟩ if using this rule more than once at a time. For example, to prove ϕ ∨ ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ), two such subproofs are needed. To di erentiate the two subproofs, we must use distinct labels of length . So, the proof theory can be motivated on purely syntactic grounds, without reference to the semantics. Motivated in this way, the semantics may still however by useful, but that is not because it it required to motivate the deduction system. Rather, it is because a model of ϕ can be used to show that ϕ is consistent, or a model of Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} can be used to show that we have no hope of proving ϕ from Γ. Of course, for the semantics to be useful for such purposes, a soundness theorem is required. e aim of the next section is to prove such a theorem (along with a completeness theorem).
. Soundness and completeness

. . Soundness
In this section we shall prove the soundness of ⊢ with respect to ⊧. at is, that for any set of formulas Γ and formula ϕ, if Γ ⊢ ϕ then Γ ⊧ ϕ.
is will go by way of de ning a model-theoretic consequence relation for labelled formulas, analogous to the corresponding proof-theoretic consequence relation. Before de ning this, we shall need to de ne a certain type of mapping from labels to (possibly empty) world sequences, which preserves certain parts of the structure of the sequences. e proof is:
(which makes use of derived rules for ∨ as well).
De nition .
• ⃗ s properly extends ⃗ t ⇔ f (⃗ s) properly extends f ( ⃗ t)
Denote the set of homomorphisms for a model M by Hom M .
ere are a few important consequences of this de nition:
Proposition .
. For any model M, Hom M ≠ ∅.
. For any f ∈ Hom M , ⃗ s and n, f (⟨⃗ s, n⟩) = ⟨ f (⃗ s), w ′ ⟩ for some w ′ such that
Proof.
. Since models are serial, there is an in nite sequence of worlds ⟨w , w , . . .⟩ such that w i Rw i+ for all i ∈ N. Now, simply de ne f (⃗ s) = ⟨w , . . . , w l(⃗ s) ⟩.
It is simple to check that this satis es the required properties.
. First, note that l( f (⃗ s, n)) = l(⃗ s, n) = l(⃗ s) + = l( f (⃗ s)) + by the second condition. Moreover, by the rst condition, f (⃗ s, n) extends f (⃗ s). Hence, we must have some w such that f (⃗ s, n) = ⟨ f (⃗ s), w⟩. e accessibility requirement follows from the fact that f (⃗ s, n) ∈ WS M .
. Suppose l(⃗ s) > , so that ⃗ s = ⟨n , . . . , n k ⟩ for some k > , and so f (⃗ s) = ⟨w , . . . , w k ⟩ ∈ WS (by the second condition).
(Note: ⟨w , . . . , w k− ⟩ may not be the same as f (⃗ s)−. In particular, this would not be the case when k = .) us, ⟨w, f (⃗ s−)⟩ = ⟨w, w , . . . , w k− ⟩ = ⟨w, f (⃗ s)⟩− as required.
We are now in a position to de ne an analogue of consequence for labelled formulas. But rst, we need to de ne a notion of satisfaction for labelled formulas:
De nition . Let M be a model, w ∈ W a world, f ∈ Hom M a homomorphism and ϕ; ⃗ s a labelled formula. en M, w, f ⊧ ϕ;
is can then be extended to sets of labelled formulas in the obvious way:
De nition . Let M be a model, w ∈ W a world, f ∈ Hom M a homomorphism and ∆ a set of labelled formulas. en M, w, f ⊧ ∆ i for all ϕ; ⃗ s ∈ ∆, M, w, f ⊧ ϕ; ⃗ s.
We can then put these together to de ne consequence for labelled formulas:
De nition . Let ∆ be a set of labelled formulas, ϕ; ⃗ s a labelled formula. en,
We can now state and prove a soundness theorem with respect to this notion of consequence, and use this to prove a soundness theorem with respect to the notion of consequence for unlabelled formulas (De nition ).
Proposition . Let ∆ be a set of labelled formulas and ϕ ; ⃗ s a labelled formula. en
Proof. First, it needs to be checked that each deduction rule is sound. at is, when
at this is so for the propositional connectives is standard (since the labels do not really play a role). It can be proved for the rules for operators as follows:
(↓-I): e deduction rule for (↓-I) is ⟨⟨Γ, ϕ ; ⃗ s⟩, ⟨Γ, ↓ϕ ; ⃗ s, n⟩⟩. Suppose that Γ ⊧ ϕ ; ⃗ s, so that for any w, f , if w, f ⊧ Γ, then w, f (⃗ s) ⊧ ϕ. Now, consider w, f such that w, f ⊧ Γ, and we wish to show that w, f (⃗ s, n) ⊧ ↓ϕ. Since f is a homomorphism,
⊧ ϕ, which we already have.
(↓-E): e deduction rule is ⟨⟨Γ, ↓ϕ ; ⃗ s⟩, ⟨Γ, ϕ, ; ⃗ s−⟩⟩. ere are two cases to consider: rstly, when ⃗ s is empty, so that ⃗ s− is also empty, and secondly when ⃗ s is not empty. Consider the rst case. Suppose that Γ ⊧ ↓ϕ ; − so that for any w, f , if w, f ⊧ Γ then ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ↓ϕ (since ⃗ s is empty, f can be safely ignored). Now consider some w, f such that w, f ⊧ Γ and so ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ↓ϕ. So, by the de nition of ↓, ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ϕ, which is as required.
Suppose that ⃗ s is not empty. Suppose Γ ⊧ ↓ϕ ; ⃗ s so that for all w, f , if
(◻-E): e deduction rule is ⟨⟨Γ, ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s⟩, ⟨Γ, ϕ ; ⃗ s, n⟩⟩. Suppose that Γ ⊧ ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s, so that for all w, f , if w, f ⊧ Γ then w, f (⃗ s) ⊧ ◻ϕ. Now consider w, f such that w, f ⊧ Γ, and we wish to show that w, f (⃗ s, n) ⊧ ϕ. By the properties of f , f (⃗ s, n) = f (⃗ s), w ′ for some w ′ such that wRw ′ . But, since w, f (⃗ s) ⊧ ◻ϕ and by the de nition of ◻, for any w ′ such that wRw
(◻-I): e deduction rule is ⟨⟨Γ, ϕ ; ⃗ s⟩, ⟨Γ, ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s−⟩⟩ with the restriction that if ψ ; ⃗ t ∈ Γ then ⃗ s properly extends ⃗ t. Suppose that Γ ⊧ ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s for such a Γ. So, for any w, f , if w, f ⊧ Γ then w, f (⃗ s) ⊧ ϕ. Now, consider w, f such that w, f ⊧ Γ. We wish to show that w, f (⃗ s−) ⊧ ◻ϕ. Suppose not, then for some
Now, it is clear that a homomorphism f ′ can be de ned such that:
and allowed to take any other permitted value elsewhere.
Now, by the restriction on the deduction rule, ⃗ s properly extends ⃗ t. But then,
Now, since each deduction rule is sound, it is simple to show the result by induction on lengths of deductions.
Finally, a soundness result can be given for the kind of entailments which are of principal importance-those between unlabelled formulas (since entailment between labelled formulas is supposed to be purely instrumental):
Proposition . Let Γ be a set of formulas of L ↓ and ϕ a formula of L ↓ . en:
Proof. All that is needed for the proof is that if Γ * ⊧ ϕ ; −, then Γ ⊧ ϕ (where Γ * is as in De nition ). Suppose that Γ * ⊧ ϕ ; −. Consider some w ∈ W M such that ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ψ for each ψ ∈ Γ. en clearly w, f (⃗ s) ⊧ ψ for each ψ, ⃗ s ∈ Γ * , since ⃗ s, and so f (⃗ s) is empty in each case. So w, f (⟨⟩) ⊧ ϕ. I.e. ⟨w⟩ ⊧ ϕ as required.
e soundness result then follows easily.
. . Completeness e completeness of the basic logic for serial frames is relatively simple and can be proved along familiar lines. It needs to be shown that for any set of formulas Γ, if Γ is consistent (i.e. Γ ⊬ ) then it is satis able (i.e. there are M, w ∈ W M such that M, ⟨w⟩ ⊧ Γ).
By the usual reasoning, there is a maximally consistent set of labelled formulas Γ ′ such that Γ * ⊆ Γ ′ (where, recall, Γ * = {ϕ; − ∶ ϕ ∈ Γ}). As in the proofs of completeness for predicate logic, some care is needed in the construction of Γ ′ so that if ϕ; ⃗ s ∈ Γ ′ , then for some n ∈ N, ϕ; ⟨⃗ s, n⟩ ∈ Γ ′ . is is analogous to the care needed in rst-order logic to ensure that if ∃xϕ appears in the maximally consistent set, then a witness appears as well. Γ ′ is then satis able in the sense that there are M,
for some n ∈ N, and a(p,
en, it is easy to check that M, ⟨⟩, f ⊧ Γ ′ . From this it is easy to see that
Now, from the result that consistent sets of formulas are satis able, it is simple to prove (in the usual way) that if Γ ⊧ ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ.
. Strengthenings
In this section, I will consider how the logic may be strengthened by the addition of rules which correspond to usual restrictions on the accessibility relation. So, I will consider extensions to the systems T, S and S , which model theoretically correspond to restricting consideration to models whose accessibility relation is re exive, transitive and re exive, and an equivalence relation, respectively.
In terms of the semantics, we can make restrictions on allowable accessibility relations in the usual way. So, for example, we can require that the relation is re exive (resulting in the system T), transitive and re exive (resulting in the system S ), or restrict attention to equivalence relations (resulting in S , which could also be achieved by doing away with the relation altogether). e latter of these brings us much closer to the kind of system which Hodes considered when introducing the backtracking operator. Other restrictions on the relation could also be considered, but I will restrict attention to these three here.
e standard way of re ecting these restrictions in the proof theory are not, however, suitable in the presence of the backtracking operator. At least, not without modi cation. So, for example, suppose that we add the following schema:
Or, alternatively, strengthen the inference rules so that ( ) is provable (cf. [ , ch. ] , [ ]). en we can instantiate ϕ with ↓ψ, for any formula ψ. e result is:
But then, from this, it clearly follows that:
resulting in a modal collapse. Likewise, the usual (T) schema:
will also cause problems. If we add its necessitation to the system, or strengthen the rules so that it is provable, then we will have as an instance:
which can be seen to entail
again resulting in a modal collapse. Finally, the usual ( ) schema:
has as an instance: ◻↓ψ → ◻↓ψ which clearly entails: ψ → ψ.
In order to add such axioms or strengthened rules, restrictions must be added on the kind of formulas which de ne instances.
First, we de ne the degree of a formula, which measures the depth of nested backtracking operators which have not been cancelled by a modal operator. e resulting de nition is equivalent to one given by [ , p .
] but we shall go via a more general de nition (which will be useful later on).
De nition . Let ϕ be a formula of L ↓ . en degs(ϕ) ⊂ N is de ned inductively as follows:
• degs(↓ϕ) = {n + ∶ n ∈ degs(ϕ)} Another approach to restricting these axioms is given by [ , Appendix . ] for a slightly di erent language. Parsons' approach is not however readily applicable to the language featuring ↓. His language features scoping operators which, instead of exempting a subformula from some xed number of modal operators, signify that some subformula falls under the scope of some xed number of modal operators.
Hodes uses his de nition to restrict the de nition of logical consequence, rather than for the purposes of restricting axioms and rules.
where n .
−m = max(n−m, ). en de ne the degree of ϕ, deg(ϕ) = max(degs(ϕ)).
e following lemma will then be useful:
Lemma . Let ϕ be any formula and M a model. en for any nite sequences of worlds ⟨w n , . . . , w ⟩, ⟨w ′ m , . . . , w ′ ⟩ (not necessarily in WS M ) such that:
• n, m ≥ deg(ϕ) and
Proof. By induction on formula complexity.
e base case, where ϕ = p is an atomic formula, is simple. en degs(p) = { }, and:
Now, suppose that ϕ is ψ ∧ θ, so that degs(ϕ) = degs(ψ) ∪ degs(θ). en:
e proof is similar when ϕ is ¬ψ. Suppose that ϕ is ◻ψ. First, note tat, if i + ∈ degs(ψ), then i ∈ degs(◻ϕ), and thus that w i = w We are now in a position to strengthen the logic. is could either be done by adding axioms, or by strengthening rules. Since it ts in better with the natural deduction style of the proof theory so far, I will consider strengthening rules, though not much hangs on this.
To strengthen the logic to (T), we strengthen the (◻-E) rule to: ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s (◻-E ′ ) ϕ ; ⃗ s with a restriction that deg(ϕ) = . ere will also be a corresponding derived rule for : ϕ ; ⃗ s ( -I ′ ) ϕ ; ⃗ s again, with a restriction to degree formulas. It is easy to check that this is derivable from ◻-E. It is also simple to prove the (T) axiom (restricted to formulas with degree ) from this rule.
To strengthen the logic to S , we add another rule for necessitation, called necessitation reiteration:
ese strengthenings of rules are all closely related to the rules in [ ], albeit using labels in place of strict subproofs, and with restrictions related to degrees. ◻ϕ ; ⃗ s (◻-R) ◻ϕ ; ⟨⃗ s, n⟩ with a restriction that deg(ϕ) = .
Again, there is a corresponding derived rule for : ϕ ; ⃗ s ( -R − ) ϕ ; ⃗ s− with the same restriction. ( e superscript on the rule name will become apparent.) And from this rule, we can easily prove the ( ) axiom (restricted to formulas with degree ). Finally, we can add another reiteration rule to strengthen the logic to S :
with the same restriction again. From this we can derive the usual ( ) axiom schema (again, restricted).
. . Soundness ese rules are sound with respect to models whose equivalence relations are re exive, transitive and re exive, and equivalence relations, respectively. In each case, the proof proceeds by use of Lemma .
Proposition . Suppose that M is such that R M is re exive, f is a homomorphism, and w ∈ W M a world. en, for any ϕ with deg(ϕ) = , if M, w, f ⊧ ◻ϕ; ⃗ s, then M, w, f ⊧ ϕ; ⃗ s.
Proof. Suppose that w, f ⊧ ◻ϕ; ⃗ s, so that ⟨w, f (⃗ s)⟩ ⊧ ◻ϕ. Let w ′ = t( f (⃗ s)). en, by Lemma , ⟨w ′ ⟩ ⊧ ◻ϕ.
By the semantic clause for ◻, for any w ′′ such that w ′ Rw ′′ , ⟨w ′ , w ′′ ⟩ ⊧ ϕ. Since R is re exive w ′ Rw ′ , and so ⟨w ′ , w ′ ⟩ ⊧ ϕ. en, by Lemma , ⟨w, f (⃗ s)⟩ ⊧ ϕ, as required.
Proposition . Suppose that M is such that R M is transitive, f is a homomorphism, and w ∈ W M a world. en, for any ϕ with deg(ϕ) = , if M, w, f ⊧ ◻ϕ; ⃗ s, then M, w, f ⊧ ◻ϕ; ⟨⃗ s, n⟩.
